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SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS:
MODERNITY AND THE LANDSCAPE 




Like many other similarly placed countries in the South, India—
perhaps the whole of South Asia—relates to the global political-
economic system and the global mass culture of our times
mainly through its modern political self. When India resists
these global orders, the resistance is articulated and legitimized
by this self; when India opens itself up for globalization, that
opening up and the zeal that goes with it are mediated through
the same self. India’s modern self scans, interprets, assesses, and
adapts to the demands of the outside world, both as an entity
that processes the outside world for the consumption of the
Indians and as an entity that processes the Indian experience for
the outsiders. The world usually knows India as it has been con-
structed by the modern Indians in collaboration with specialist
Western scholarship on India. Orientalism is frequently a joint
“dream work” where the defenses and cultural “armor” of the
West is matched by a self-representation and self-engineering of
the modernizing non-West.
Because these processes tend to get telescoped into the per-
sonalities of the social actors involved, the modern Indian is
usually in dialogue with himself or herself when seemingly in
dialogue with the rest of the world. From social and religious
reformer Rammohun Roy (1772 – 1833), popularly known as the
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father of modern India, to filmmaker Satyajit Ray (1920 – 92),
probably the last larger-than-life figure India’s encounter with
the colonial West produced, even the most ardent modernists
have had to engage in that dialogue, often with mixed results.2
Sometimes this dialogue has to be established, through a
tremendous effort of will, almost as an exercise in self-creation.
Thus, Satyajit Ray has described in painful detail how he, as an
urbane, highly Westernized Indian, discovered the Indian vil-
lage while making a film trilogy that was to paradoxically
become, for the world cinema, the last word on the Indian vil-
lage. As this example itself shows, such implosive dialogues
may be anguished, but they also sometimes allow enormously
creative uses of living in two cultures.3
In politics, the most remarkable part of this dialogue with self
is how little the modern Indian self is dependent on or in con-
versation with what is commonly believed to be the traditional
Indian definitions of state, political authority, or political leader-
ship. Despite the immense fascination with Kautilya within
India and outside, the Arthashastra has not manifestly influenced
the contemporary Indian’s political self-definition. Indians have
been even less influenced by the political history of ancient or
medieval India and the conventions of statecraft unearthed by
that history. Although large empires were run by a galaxy of
Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and Sikh dynasties, and although the
histories of some of these dynasties have been grist for the mills
of national and subnational chauvinism in recent times, on the
whole they too have not left any significant memory trace
behind. Ashoka is more of a living presence in contemporary Sri
Lankan politics than in Indian. Although names such as Rana
Pratap and Guru Govind Singh are ritually invoked in Hindu
nationalist propaganda, no recent mainstream Indian politician
has been influenced in the least by any of these worthies. Even
as metaphors, these figures have been marginal to contempo-
rary Indian public life. (The case of Shivaji is a little different
because he has become identified with regional and non-Brah-
minic caste pride in one region of India.) If the cadres of the
Hindu nationalist parties bring up these names once in a while
in the service of their moth-eaten nineteenth-century colonial
interpretation of Hinduism, the other modern Indians reject
Macalester International Vol. 4
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them as parts of a cultural baggage that deserves to be only a
target of millennial social engineering.
Apart from the colonial state, the only other state that has left
some memory traces behind is the Mughal Empire, and that is
partly because during the early years of the Raj, the style of gov-
ernance and the culture of politics (especially the frame of legiti-
macy) were recognizably Mughal in some respects, and they
were designed to be so.4 Until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the British in India were not only sometimes called
“nabobs,” but they also continued to rule India with one eye on
the conventions of the Mughal Empire, the other on European
ideas of statecraft. Even the official language of the Raj was Per-
sian for about seventy-five years. The culture of the state for a
long while after that reflected not only the influence of impor-
tant currents of British political thought but also the culture that
had crystallized during the first seventy-five years of the Raj.
Bernard Cohn’s work on the “codification of ritual idiom” under
the Raj has a tacit narrative dealing with this bifocal vision: how
the British defined themselves in India and how they sought to
link this self-definition to the idea of the state in the minds of the
ruled. For instance, the Darbar of 1911, Cohn suggests, repli-
cated the Mughal court rituals in many ways and sought to
derive consent for the Raj by systematically invoking Indian
ideas of rulership.5 The coronation of King George V was simul-
taneously a Mughal coronation.
However, by the 1860s, this culture became slowly marginal-
ized and was pushed further underground by an increasingly
assertive, Utilitarian ideology of the state that linked up with
wider demands and expectations from the state in the more
articulate, politicized sections of the Indian people. It is this sec-
ond concept of state that has evolved gradually into a quasi-
Hegelian imagination of the state in contemporary India. The
process of transformation has not been entirely linear, but it has
continued to have two identifiable features. First, this image of
the ideal state is still heavily dependent on nineteenth-century
Anglo-Saxon texts on the state and its social evolutionist legacy;
and second, that dependence has been defined much more by
texts than by the practice of statecraft in Europe. As a result, the
ideal state in modern India still carries with it a touch of purism
and a certain fear of clumsiness, ambiguity, and the dirty
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imprint of life. At the same time, there is paradoxically a contin-
uous defensive attempt to define statecraft as a dirty, hard-eyed,
masculine game of realpolitik that Indians, especially overly
idealistic, romantic Indian critics of India’s external policies and
nuclear and security choices, cannot fathom.
Also, during the years India’s modern political identity was
being formed, the only real-life experience with the state to
which the modern Indians were exposed was the imperial
British-Indian state. Hence, the idea of the state that dominates
modern India is that of an imperial state run, naturally enough
now, by Westernized Indians well-versed in Anglo-Saxon theo-
ries of the state. Statecraft means for many Indians a centralized
command structure; a patriarchal welfare system for the poor
and the powerless; or an apparatus for impartial arbitration
among permanently squabbling tribes, castes, religions, lan-
guage groups, and regions, and for the slow and steady inculca-
tion in the citizens of the spirit of Baconian science. Hence also
the modern Indian’s almost desperate belief that he or she
stands between the wolves in the global nation-state system and
the vulnerable sheep in the form of the irrational uninformed
majority of the Indians.6
The picture does not change dramatically even when reli-
gious chauvinists begin to speak of a Hindu state. That state,
too, remains quasi-Hegelian, and it, too, is associated with deep
fears that the ordinary Hindus would not be able to sustain it. In
fact, Hindu nationalists’ hatred of the Muslims is matched only
by their contempt for the other Hindus. For the nationalists
would like to herd all Hindus, too, like cattle toward the beati-
tude of a well-defined nationality, hitched to a national-security
state modeled on the nineteenth-century European concept of
the state. Hindu chauvinists are plaintively waiting for a Hindu
Bismarck to emerge who will forge a nineteenth-century nation-
state at the far end of the twentieth century to liberate semi-
Westernized Hindus from the non-Hindus on the one hand and
from the infra-Hindus on the other. Even the ideology of Hindu
nationalism, which is supposed to back up such a state, is
pathetically dependent on European nationalism of the kind
popularized by the likes of Mazzini and Herder, who wrote of
culture as the soul of a people and whom many Hindu national-
Macalester International Vol. 4
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ists in colonial times adored, as much perhaps for their ideologi-
cal fervor as for their maudlin tone.7
A more clinical way of describing the situation could be to say
that the modern Indians have stabilized their modern self by
internalizing the colonial ideology of the state they confronted
in the nineteenth century. Such a self has limited space for even
the new currents of political culture—especially new editions of
some other lesser-known ideas associated with the state in
Europe and North America that have allowed them to partially
transcend the gory history of wars and conquests in recent
years. Modern Indians’ frozen concept of the state contains not
only indigenized European ideas of nationality, nationalism,
progress, rationality, and secularism but even a unique concept
of a desirable society built mostly on once-popular ideas of
European thinkers and their Indian editions prepared by a series
of Indian public figures. To give random examples, Bertrand
Russell, H. G. Wells, Harold Laski, Christopher Caudwell, and
Maurice Cornforth survived much longer in the warmer, grate-
ful climate of the tropics than in the colder, forgetful climate of
Europe and North America.
Such an imagination of the state includes a reactive compo-
nent. Many Indians have, over the last one hundred years,
worked hard to establish that Indian cultures had traditionally
included each of the cultural prerequisites required for the sus-
tenance of a modern state in India — from Baconian rationality
to post-Reformation secularism. Once these previously
repressed or cornered themes are rediscovered and revalued,
their argument goes, whatever little contradiction between tra-
ditions and modernity that exists in India will dissolve, as has
reportedly happened in countries like Japan.8
In this way of looking at the past, British rule was implicitly a
God-sent instrument to modernize India and retool the natives,
and such modernization had to involve the jettisoning of the
“dysfunctional” and “degraded” aspects of heritage as a liabil-
ity. The various brands of religious and ethnic nationalists have
done one better. Their model being European nationalist
thought, they have actually tried to subvert the organizational
frame of the heritage and reconstruct it according to the needs of
a modern nationality. If the record of the Hindu Mahasabha and
the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) looks abysmal in the
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matter of India’s freedom struggle, it is because Hindu national-
ism discovered quite early that silence, even if not direct collab-
oration with the colonial rule, paid handsome political
dividends and left it free to pursue its agenda against the
minorities on the one hand, and nonmodern and nonmoderniz-
able Hinduism on the other. The record of Muslim nationalism
in South Asia, of the kind represented by Syed Ahmad Khan,
perfectly mimics that of its sworn enemies among the Hindus.9
All these responses are probably contextualized by the growing
salience of what can only be called a historical or historicized
self in Indian public life.
II. The Enterprise of History
The first few generations of British administrators and English-
educated Indians produced a substantial volume of historical
work on India. Although historical scholarship (or at least some-
thing akin to that) was not entirely unknown to either Islamic or
Hindu traditions, the history the colonial historians produced
was disjunctive with the constructions of the past the South
Asians knew. It was history as it was conceptualized and institu-
tionalized by the European Enlightenment. In any event, in
South Asia history itself had never enjoyed the absolute or deep
legitimacy it had in modern Europe.10 Nor did it enjoy or seek, in
its premodern forms, a monopoly on interpretations of the past.
Most South Asians used other ways of constructing the past;
European-style history to them was a new methodology/tech-
nology of organizing memories and a new form of conscious-
ness that seemed to negate many traditional categories of
thought and much of the traditional moral universe.
It is not clear what kind of legitimacy these new histories
came to enjoy in India outside the modern sector. They certainly
did not remain only in school and college texts; nor did they
replace other forms of memories in even the middle-class fami-
lies that opted for modern education and noisily and aggres-
sively began to lament the absence of historical memory in the
Indians.11 Although many modernized Indians thought they had
shed their past and chosen to live with a truncated self that had
aggressively banished the ahistorical, next to them lived other
Indians, often in the same household, who led a life informed
Macalester International Vol. 4
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with rich but nonhistorical modes of constructing the past —
with living myths, legends, epics, and folkways. They also pre-
sumably had their own nonhistorical “theories” of what the his-
torical mode meant or did.
The passions that attached to history among the historically
minded Indians were, however, not the ones that attached to the
discipline in the by-now-more-fully-historical societies. Nor was
it the same as the attitude to history of those outside history. The
newcomers to history implicitly saw history as a new kind of
epic or moral myth that had to be constantly reaffirmed to fight
the wretched state of Indian society. Enemies of history increas-
ingly began to look to them like enemies of the Indian people.
One is tempted to venture the proposition, in the context of the
events of recent years, that one of the main sources of Hindu
and Buddhist chauvinism in South Asia lies in the repressed,
extra-historical attitude to history that survives in South Asia’s
historical self. In Pakistan, the same dynamics have come to
inform the production and distribution of official history in a
consumable form in recent decades.12 History, while historiciz-
ing the world, dehistoricizes itself. The passions that underlie
history, therefore, remain unnegotiated and begin to use history
as a massive defensive shield and a new justification for vio-
lence and expropriation. The absence of self-reflexivity of Indian
historians themselves and their tendency to prioritize history
over life in the name of objectivity, neither an uncommon trait in
the global culture of history, have contributed handsomely to
the new, violent uses of history in India.
The idea of history, it should be obvious from the foregoing,
has linked up with not merely the new idea of the state but also
its various components, especially the emerging concepts of the
national state, nationalism, and national security; the theory of
progress as concretized in the ideas and processes of develop-
ment; secularism, especially its various South Asian, Left-
Hegelian versions; and a distinct Baconian concept of scientific
rationality brought into public life as the final justification of all
the other components.13 When modern Indians, irrespective of
their ideological postures, opted for the Utilitarian—and imper-
ial—concept of the state, they also had to own up to the fact that
European history was more relevant to Indian futures than the
unreliable, scrappy accounts of the past in India. They did this
Ashis Nandy
229
04/18/97  2:37 PM      0915nan3.qxd
so systematically that some thinkers came to feel that India’s his-
tory had been stolen and that the country was being forced to
live on borrowed history.14
This emergence and acceptance of the historical self, then,
became quickly intertwined with the making and unmaking of
Indian pasts and the telescoped presence of European history in
these attempts to ensure the reconstruction of India’s past along
historical lines. This came in two versions. Either India’s histori-
cal past was made to look like a belated replication of European
history, or it became, as in the various Left-Hegelian doctrines,
all of India’s past and, hence, a point of departure for all social
criticism (so that in social and political analysis, the categories
and the narratives could come from the First World, while the
conclusions drawn and the prescriptions offered could apply to
the Third World).15 All other memories related to the past were
pushed out of serious intellectual consideration in modern India
and were kept open for the use of the rustic, the women, the cre-
ative artists, the illiterate, the insane, and the superstitious.
The self that emerges from the crucible of history has different
features from that of the self that emerges from the crucible of
myths, legends, and epics. In both cases, the self has to cope
with memories, but the historical self configures memories dif-
ferently from the way the ahistorical self does.
In the first case, memories are available for scrutiny, for tests
of reliability and validity. The scrutiny is usually mounted from
the vantage of what can be called distant, dispassionate objectiv-
ity, for such objectivity is supposed to guarantee the truth-value
of propositions about the past. (The idea of truth used here is
that of modern science, not that of the moral philosopher or cul-
tural or “holistic” ecologist who might leave some scope for
nonmaterial truths in his or her model.)16 Memories that fail the
scrutiny are in effect declared nonmemories or antimemories
and are either banished from history or studied clinically as
rumors or stereotypes, or handed over as fantasies to artists and
writers for creative use. If some individuals and groups never-
theless insist on retaining or returning to these memories in his-
tory, they can do so; but others, if spiteful, would call such
history pseudo-history or, if they were generous, myths or fan-
tasies. There are persons or communities in the modern world
that insist on living with “unreliable” and “invalid” history.17
Macalester International Vol. 4
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These individuals and communities usually end up as case his-
tories for psychiatrists and researchers in social pathology.
But there are other persons and groups outside the modern
world who live with selves that originate and are grounded in
ahistorical modes of constructing the past — in legends, myths,
and epics — that cannot be that easily fitted into the clinical for-
mat, even though some first-generation, overenthusiastic psy-
choanalysts did try to do so at one time. Sometimes, when
return to childhood or to unencumbered, creative innocence
becomes an important cultural theme (as in the late 1960s and
early 1970s), people and groups who make that kind of regres-
sion can even be seen as paragons of normality, creativity, and
transcendental awareness. The epithets “primitive” and ahistor-
ical may then begin to carry an ambivalent load in historical
societies where they may occasionally provide a respite from the
psychological closure the historical consciousness has come to
represent.18 Otherwise, the effort is usually to separate the his-
torical self from its ahistorical contexts. (The ongoing debate
about the personality and biography of Jesus Christ in Western
Christendom, for instance, parallels similar debates that have
been taking place since the middle of the nineteenth century
about Hindu gods and goddesses.)19
Configuring the historically grounded self in an ahistorical
society, however, acquires a second-order complexity where
such a self does not get the “normal” consensual validation from
either the community or the larger culture. Such a self has to
work on limited or partial endorsement from the scraps of his-
torical selves constructed in the modern sector, often by psycho-
logically uprooted, atomized individuals and small sectlike
professional groups. History in India is basically a modest enter-
prise having a limited reach; it is not the entire constructed past.
It has to compete with other such constructions and can either
triumph over them or lose out to them.20
III. Uprooting and Its Compensations
Nation-state and history, when wedded to an urban-industrial
vision and attempts to actualize the vision through conventional
development, become a potent combination. They become a
complex of ideas particularly appealing to persons and groups
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confronting the experience of uprooting, breakdown of commu-
nities, and a sense of exile. Whether it actually does so or not,
this complex is presumed to work better when it operates on the
assumption of a cultural tabula rasa and authenticates forms of
cultural intervention that ensure the decline of communities and
the reduction of the person turning India and its neighboring
countries — trying to redress their record of victimhood by
catching up with the developed societies, according to dominant
contemporary ideas of success — into a territory of the territori-
ally or psychologically uprooted. The ideas of nation-state and
history have begun to play new, more important political-psy-
chological roles in South Asia.
There is nothing specifically new in this situation. Most
ancient-societies-turned-young-nation-states are learning to live
in a world dominated by the psychology and culture of exile.
For some, the twentieth century has been a century of refugees.21
Others, like Hannah Arendt, have identified refugees as virtu-
ally a new “species” of human beings that has come to symbol-
ize the violence of our times. Refugees as contemporary
symbols, however, represent something more than the patholo-
gies of the global nation-state system. They also represent a state
of mind, a form of psychosocial displacement that has become
endemic to modernizing societies. Defined thus, most refugees
do not have to cross national frontiers to become refugees, and
many, when they do so, are more “pulled” by the seductive
appeals of self-induced displacement than the “push” of an
oppressive or violent system.22 It is this changed status of territo-
riality in human life that explains why, in immigrant societies
like the United States, the metaphor of exile now looks jaded.
There are some who have already begun to argue that human
beings need not have a “home,” that the idea itself is a red her-
ring.23 Given the cultural hierarchy in the world, many, it seems,
have become reconciled to living with a labile sense of self. Dis-
placement and the psychology of exile are in; cultural continu-
ities and settled communities are out — they have a touch of
ennui associated with them.
However, in societies such as China and India, which both cit-
izens and outsiders were accustomed to viewing as relatively
stable and unchanging, adjustment to the pacesetting role now
given to the culture of exile is disorienting and unnerving. In
Macalester International Vol. 4
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India, where the metaphor of eternal India continues as an
important part of the public lexicon, the spread of the culture of
uprootedness has produced new cultural dislocations and social
tensions. Yet, many aspects of uprooting that take place in South
Asia remain invisible. We have not yet noticed, for instance, that
the psychology of displacement is becoming a serious presence
in the South Asian landscape and that many elements of South
Asian public life are readjusting to the culture of the uprooted.
However, politicians everywhere are a superbly alert lot. They
never wait for political scientists to supply analysis that would
guide action. The South Asian politicians have grasped the
power and the reach of this culture of psychological lability.
They have sensed that, even though it is the culture of a minor-
ity, it nonetheless offers immense political opportunities, per-
haps the most important of which is the scope it offers for
large-scale mobilization. South Asian politicians, therefore, have
refashioned their platforms and campaigns to cater to the pas-
sions of the banished and the uprooted.
As a result, the metaphor of continuity has paradoxically
acquired a strange new status in Indian public life — it has
become a potent myth. This is precisely because a large propor-
tion of Indians feel uprooted geographically, culturally, and
psychologically, and, while living with a culture of flux that
they have accepted as a ruling culture, want small, symbolic
areas of a turbulence-free life of predictability and continuity.
These Indians demand psychological security and cultural con-
stancy of a kind that not even a highly stable, isolated society
can provide. These demands are honed by the growing evidence
of flux all around. In this respect, what the great Partition riots
in 1947 could not do, despite uprooting (on a conservative esti-
mate) ten million people, massive urbanization and industrial-
ization backed by development have managed to do. Many
communities in India are now predominantly, and in some cases
entirely, communities of the displaced. Estimates are that one-
third of the entire tribal population of India, consisting of at
least 200 different tribes, has been displaced.24 That is, some
tribes are now entirely tribes of refugees, uprooted from their
natural habitats, traditional vocations, lifestyles, and life-sup-
port systems. Their deculturation and disintegration as commu-
nities are virtually complete.
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Some other communities have been dramatically pushed into
urban industrial life because of the loss or unsustainability of
their traditional vocations or growing social discrimination or
exploitation. When India became independent, its urban popu-
lation was around 70 million. Today, although the population of
urban Indians has risen by only 5 percent to about 25 percent,
they already number nearly 250 million — larger than all but
three countries in the world. We do not have corresponding fig-
ures for Indians who move from one language area to another,
from communities to individuated urban slums, from rooted
vocations to contractual jobs. Many of these first-generation
urban Indians show the characteristic psychology of the
uprooted, and they, too, have begun to bend the Indian political
culture to their needs. Many communities of traditional artisans,
especially the Muslims and the Dalits, fall into this category.
Also, as agriculture becomes industrialized, many landless
laborers and small farmers are unable to sustain their traditional
vocations. They are migrating to the cities and assembling there
in urban slums, which are becoming the down-market depots of
the culture of exile.
In recent decades, agriculture has handsomely contributed to
the growth of the culture of the slum. The economic growth and
prosperity resulting from large-scale cultivation of crash crops
like sugarcane has led to demands for mega-dams, diversion or
monopolization of water resources, deforestation, drought, and
rising salinity in some parts of the region. Thus, the Farakka bar-
rage and the destruction of the Ganges have led to uprooting
and emigration not only from Southwest Bangladesh to India
but also from Bihar and, to a lesser extent, West Bengal to other
parts of India.
This is an age of exile in many senses. Not only have many
communities that until recently seemed settled experienced
colossal dislocation through migration, war, unbridled urban-
ization, and megadevelopment, but a large part of the world is
also now inhabited by people who have experienced or carry
within them memories of uprooting. Even nowadays when we
talk of a global order dominated by one superpower, that power
represents, among other things, the power of the immigrants,
the refugees, the uprooted, the decultured and/or recultured. It
is this culture, and the public values that can survive in a society
Macalester International Vol. 4
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of uprooted, that dominates the global cultural order. Few will
disagree that America is primarily a culture of the uprooted, but
fewer will admit that it is a culture of the uprooted that must
deny that it is atypical, that it prefers to see itself as a model for
the rest of the world, a haven where the poor, the powerless,
and the discarded of other lands have come and remade their
lives voluntarily and produced a culture that now makes trans-
cultural sense. This preference is continuously endorsed by the
elites of other countries, especially that of the Third World, con-
stantly talking of catching up with the United States in the dis-
tant future.
That culture of exile now seeks to remake the world in its own
image. In fact, the entire post-World War II world and the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century can be read as the unfolding of
the politics of that effort, though the celebration of the effort had
begun before the effort had, in the interwar years. This is no
wholesale criticism of the culture of uprootedness. In fact, it is
an acknowledgement that while some of this century’s greatest
creative achievements might have come from uprooting, decul-
turation, and the breakdown of communities, some of the great-
est pathologies of our times, too, can be traced to the sense of
exile and loneliness that has haunted the modern individual.
The ambience of the Weimar Republic and the cultural citadels
of Europe, such as Paris, Vienna, and London in the interwar
years—the celebration of loneliness, exile, uncertainty, and limi-
nality in lifestyles, literature, fine arts, and cinema—contributed
to the closure of the European mind in the 1930s. To speak in
terms of extremes, Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) and Albert Camus
(1913 – 60) are part of the same cultural process that produced
European fascism.
The self that modernity-as-exile spawns has a few specific fea-
tures. In its more integrative form, it is compatible with what
Robert J. Lifton calls the protean personality.25 In its more prob-
lematic form, it tends to underwrite many of the pathologies
that have been major markers of the twentieth century. While
the overstretched modern self offers us a wide range of choices
for self-construction and self-expression, it cannot adequately
protect our self-consistency and self-continuity. That consis-
tency and continuity have to be sought through specialist
options — psychotherapy, religious or spiritual self-discovery
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movements, millennialism in politics, and, above all, ethno-reli-
gious chauvinism and nationalism.
India has chosen to confront its overstretched modernity
mainly through ethnic chauvinism and ultranationalism. Few
have recognized the promise of psychological security and
“therapeutic” solace that fundamentalism and ethnic conflicts
have begun to offer in modernizing India. To this India, the vio-
lence outside promises to bind the violence within. Those living
in this India survive on a dislocated cultural self-definition pre-
cariously perched on a labile sense of the self and are, for that
very reason, continually seeking to ground it in a sense of com-
munity that would restore some cultural — and through it, per-
sonal — continuity.26 They may not be open to serious political
appeals or to deep analysis of public life, but they are open to
populist slogans and demagoguery, especially of the type that
promises new brands of communitarian pseudo-solidarity à la
Hannah Arendt. In open societies based on competitive party
systems, politicians seeking to mobilize the massified sections of
the citizens for electoral purposes through centralized commu-
nication machines quickly identify these needs and exploit them
in various innovative ways.27
In recent decades, South Asian slums, like their South Ameri-
can and East Asian counterparts, have become the ultimate tar-
gets of all kinds of extremist groups—from ethnic chauvinists to
crime syndicates like the cosa nostra — that promise the individ-
ual a community and a chance of escape from loneliness and
massification. The “antisocial elements” that political analysts
and journalists in South Asia incessantly blame for ethnic and
communal violence are merely the fringe of a large social sector
nearer home that the middle classes in the region would like to
forget.
The clearest example of this came when the Babri Masjid was
demolished. The movement leading up to the event—the biggest
of its kind since Independence — had received its most active
support from middle-class populations in small towns and cities;
it now turned out that a majority in the demolition-squad [sic]
also came from provincial backgrounds.
History was made that day, but not by metropolitan India
which was relegated to the level of captive bystanders, released
Macalester International Vol. 4
236
04/18/97  2:37 PM      0915nan3.qxd
afterwards to deal with the repercussions of the event through
either post-facto analysis or communal rioting. Provincial India
had upstaged it, and in doing so had only given a small demon-
stration of its potential.
For, apart from demolishing the Babri Masjid and so peremp-
torily revising the national agenda, it was also . . .bringing forth a
new kind of sensibility: one that could combine in itself a taste for
strident politics, violent films, ostentatious architecture, lewd
music, rumour-mongering newspapers, and overcooked food.
. . . From all accounts, Indian small towns and cities had shed
their earlier sleepy, half-apologetic air.28
These newly self-assertive identities are generally susceptible
to the appeals of various forms of nationalism that depend on
centralized, mass-media-based communications and mobiliza-
tional strategies. India may not be a mass society, but even the
process of massification has released new demands and created
spaces for ideologies that promise to fill the void that the break-
down of communities and “primordialities” has created. These
promises are based on packaged forms of faiths that can serve
both as substitutes for faiths seemingly unable to survive in
their earlier form under globalized lifestyles and as political ide-
ologies particularly suited to middle-class mobilization. In both
incarnations, the ideologies permit a certain degree of canaliza-
tion of what would otherwise be free-floating violence.
But apart from its close links with the growing culture of vio-
lence, the psychology of uprootedness and exile is associated
with a number of personality traits that have been much adored
in the literature and folklore of development: greater individual
initiative, entrepreneurship, and competitiveness. Immigrants
are comparatively more pushy, more risk-taking, and less bur-
dened by principles of sociality and shared cultural norms in
their professional and business deals.29 The refugees created in
the aftermath of the Partition in western India, on whom there
are some scrappy data, are aggressive within family and out-
side, and their trust in the interpersonal world around them is
low.30 This aggressiveness and distrust acquire a dangerous
edge because the refugees also tend to have a stronger sense of
invulnerability.31 One of the unnoticed findings of the once-pop-
ular studies of achievement motive as the engine of economic
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growth was the links between spatial mobility, uprootedness,
and higher levels of achievement motivation.32 Indeed, to com-
plete the picture of the contemporary ideal of the achieving per-
son, David McClelland borrowed from The Homeric Hymn to
Hermes the imagery of Hermes, the Hellenic god who began
traveling the day he was born.
Hermes presumably had a place to come back to, and that
myth of a place of return must have been for all believers a liv-
ing reality for centuries. In contemporary times, the chances are
that such an idea of return, or of a place to return to, has primar-
ily a mythic status and is available mainly as a consumable fan-
tasy. Vladimir Nabokov’s Russia and Salman Rushdie’s India
are obvious examples.
IV. The Myth of Return
Perhaps the basic formulation in this essay can now be further
sharpened. South Asia is now linked to the global order not
merely through its modern political self but, more specifically,
through historicized readings of its past and the traumata of
uprootedness. Both are seeking in the ideology of the state, and
in various forms of nationalism floating around in the market,
greater psychological security, stability, and symbolic redress of
cultural defeat.
However, that formulation does not say much about how the
modern political self in India confronts the panoply of other
selves or about the unequal contest among those selves to shape
the future of India’s political culture and the nature of transfor-
mative politics in the region. This brings us back to the issue of a
political self that is primarily in dialogue with itself because
such an act includes a dialogue with the world. True, that con-
versation with self can be defensive, for it is a conversation
partly with those who have been defined either as being on the
other side of a monolithic granite wall of traditions or as masses
of poor, culturally deprived, somewhat obstreperous trainee cit-
izens. But it is conversation nonetheless. The fact that it takes
place gives it a political status of its own. Without these dialogi-
cal experiences, the modern Indian’s nineteenth-century politi-
cal self will be even more in touch with the past of Europe than
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with its present, even more in touch with Europe’s construction
of India than with India as most other Indians see it or live it.
To build a political self outside this model is to build partly
outside history and science; it is to begin living partly outside
modern India, seeing those already living there as outcasts. That
is a painful choice socially and even psychologically. Such a
skepticism toward the mainstream culture of elite politics
demands a different set of identifications, empathy, and forms
of psychological mobility. It involves the admission that most
Indians most of the time live in another India. De-recognizing
this forgotten majority, in an open society and in competitive
democratic politics, is a sure prescription for political defeat and
an even surer indicator of the precariousness of the modern self
in India. This is a contradiction built into India’s political self
that nothing, not even the immense power of globalization and
unbridled capitalism, can remove. It has to be worked through
the way the process of psychoanalysis does with a case history of
self — by “contemporarizing” history, by ahistoricizing history
in order to access levels of consciousness that are nonhistorical
or, as the moderns would have it, prehistorical. As in all clinical
disciplines, history has to be coped with and opened up for
intervention by converting diachronicity into synchronicity.
Clinically, then, history is not a way of structuring the past but
of opening up the present and the future.33
Contemporary concerns, then, are throwing up different con-
cepts of cultures in South Asia; they challenge the universality
of the modern self grounded in the European experience with
the Enlightenment. Such thrusts are not relativistic but bring
forth alternative forms of cosmopolitanism and universalism.34
They seem to question the Enlightenment’s implicit faith that
while there can be many forms of relativism, there can be only
one form of universalism. These alternative forms can be desta-
bilizing; they challenge the meaning of life of generations of
Indians who, under the colonial dispensation, worked with
nineteenth-century European concepts of the Indian culture and
had a much more romantic and optimistic image of the Euro-
pean enterprise on the world stage.35 These Indians see the
growing demands for the renegotiation of terms between cul-
ture and modern selfhood as destructive. The demands seem to
negate the modern social and religious reform movements that
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began in the 1820s and, thus, the core legitimacy of the modern
nation-state and the elite who seem born to it. The fact that there
has been some erosion in the cultural self-confidence of Euro-
pean and North American intellectual elites, and some openness
to multiculturalism among them, has further unnerved modern
Indians. For that, too, seems to endorse the movement of the
peripheralized Indians, unexposed or hostile to the modern self,
to the center of the political stage.
As a result, exactly as the historical self in India is contextual-
ized by the passions and interests of the nonhistorical modes of
construction of the past, the modern self too is buffeted by pre-
modern, nonmodern, or countermodern categories and pas-
sions. Not merely outside but also within. This is another
stratum of political awareness that shapes modernity funda-
mentally without being much influenced by it.
V. Contending Selves
In Werner Herzog’s movie Where the Green Ants Dream, there is a
moving sequence where an old Australian Aborigine, who does
not speak a word of English, barges into the witness box during
a court trial that is about to decide the land rights of Australian
Aborigines vis-à-vis a uranium mining company. The man
begins to deliver a long speech in an incomprehensible lan-
guage. The shocked judge tells the lawyer fighting the cause of
the Aborigines that he should restrain his client. The lawyer can-
not, and when he tries to communicate with the trespasser with
the help of the other Aborigines, even they fail. It then transpires
that the man in the witness box is the last surviving member of
an extinct tribe and nobody in the world understands him.
This moment in the movie can be read in two ways. First, it is
a moment that stresses the meaningless survival of an individ-
ual who cannot share his thoughts with anyone in the world and
has to wait for a lonely death to finalize the extinction of a cul-
tural species and a community. It is also, however, a moment
that symbolizes the bankruptcy of the dominant global con-
sciousness complicit with the process of extinction, a conscious-
ness that does not even know that it is impoverished by the
death of a cultural strain or aware of the brutalization unleashed
by that insensitivity. Savagery lies not where the indigenous
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people once stayed or are staying, nor where the dirty work of
colonialism or development is done, Herzog seems to suggest,
but at the cultural centers of our ideas of cosmopolitanism and
impartial justice.
Herzog, who must have lived through the eras of German
reconstruction, megadevelopment, and the Green movement,
uses a number of cinematic devices to convey his message. For
instance, he “sets the stage” by painting a picture of a totally
polluted environment and a pockmarked landscape, bearing
manmade scars like the victim of some terrible skin disease.
Herzog also makes it clear at the beginning who has won the
battle of the worlds and who rules the world today. Only ideo-
logically motivated, lonely individuals within the system can
now sometimes see through it. To do so, they have to be either
someone like the ineffective but well-intentioned, innocent hero
or someone morally repelled by the ruling culture, such as the
eccentric anthropologist living as a recluse outside civilization
or the liberal public interest lawyer. They are the ones who pro-
vide scrappy, moving, but also doomed resistance or dissent.
This flimsy base of dissent in the personal morality of a few
atomized individuals is matched by the loveably arcane, dis-
senting ideology used by the Aborigines protesting uranium
mining in their ancestral lands, namely their belief that uranium
mining will disturb the dreams of the green ants and thus
threaten the survival of the world. Herzog’s brilliance ultimately
convinces his audience that the Aborigines’ belief deserves a
treatment other than psychoanalysis, that it probably represents
a higher-order sanity and rationality. Yet, the movie leaves one
with the overall impression of incommensurability and self-
defeating charity on the one hand, and “inaudible” dissent on
the other.
In Satyajit Ray’s Agantuk (The Visitor), the same social prob-
lem is differently posed and handled. Ray, in his last years a
newcomer to the world of environmentalism, seems much less
aware of what he is doing politically. Agantuk is the story of the
“lost” uncle of a typical urban middle-class family in Calcutta
whom the family knows basically as a professional globetrotter.
He briefly returns, uninvited, as a suspicious stranger to his
family to upset the steady, predictable rhythm of middle-class
conformism. The uncle, who turns out to be a distinguished
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anthropologist, has by now turned into a savage critic of mod-
ern civilization and its cultural stratarchies. The dramatic high
point of the film comes when the uncle suddenly leaves and the
paranoic family finds out that the uncle was not a crook after the
family’s wealth, but had actually come to will his property to the
family. The family desperately looks for its benefactor and
locates him in a village of Santals, one of the most systematically
victimized communities in India’s march toward modernity.
The real communication between generations begins when the
wife, who was always a little more open to the stranger, joins the
Santals in an uninhibited dance. This time the uncle accepts her
fully because in her attempts to self-transcend, he sees the begin-
ning of self-discovery and a continuation of his own critical self.
There is no devastated landscape or Tarkovsky-like invoca-
tion of the terror of soul-killing hyper-urbanity in Ray. The San-
tal village, it turns out, is not very far from Calcutta, and it
survives in poverty, indignity, and neglect, but also in simplicity
and natural charm. On the other hand, the “modern affluence”
of the urban middle-class family is not that conspicuous or con-
sumption-oriented either. To many Western and some South
Asian viewers, Ray’s idea of affluence might even look like
another less obtrusive version of poverty. There is also a vague,
tacit admission in the narrative that the urban middle class that
is being depicted as conformist and myopic is, while increas-
ingly vociferous and dominant, not the whole of India, that the
class still constitutes a minority. The divide between the urbane
bourgeois life and the world of the uncle and his Santal friends
is sharp, but there is no frontier of incommensurability between
the two. When the heroine joins the Santals in their dance, she is
not so much actualizing the dream of her uncle as admitting a
previously repressed part of herself. The rest of the family cer-
tainly doesn’t feel embarrassed by her spontaneity either. The
community in some sense has been restored, even if only sym-
bolically.
Thus, what is a basic incommensurability in Herzog’s finale is
a problem of partitioned self in Ray’s. It’s as if Ray, otherwise a
fully formed ideologue of modernity, was admitting that certain
possibilities open only through the exercise of moral imagina-
tion in the case of the Australian Aborigines were open in India
through self-excavation and the ability to “work through” one’s
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not-so-deep psychological defenses. As if to Ray, globalization
were not the end of cultures, for as globalization made inroads
into the interstices of cultures, so did the politics of cultural self-
affirmation and self-exploration.
Exactly as some South Sea Islanders paid for the blessings of
civilization by contracting syphilis, anthropologist and political
activist Fred Chiu suggests, globalized capital has to pay for its
expansion by facing the proliferating movements and strains of
consciousness — romantic, nasty, utopian, backward-looking,
given to excesses, insane. Such affirmations of cultures and
identities never restore the past. For post-globalization affirma-
tion of traditions is different from the affirmation of cultures
when attacks on culture are seen as external and not as some-
thing threatening to take over one’s household, children,
friends, and even one’s most intimate moments (through stan-
dardized textbooks on parent-child relations or by offering con-
sumers a choice of shades and textures in condoms, for
instance). It is possible to argue that this new, often-insecure
self-affirmation brings onto the world stage a new strain of cul-
tures and identities that lack the easy, less-self-aware affirma-
tion of cultures and identities when they are not threatened.
Often the new affirmations bring out traditions and cultures
badly contaminated by the principles of dominance and vio-
lence that characterize the present global mass culture. The
Islam that has come into play in many exiled communities —
among Palestinian refugees, Pakistanis in Bradford (England),
Bosnians, or Indians on American campuses—is not the same as
the Islam that is a part of everyday life in much of the Islamic
world. The intellectual challenge is to identify the principal
characteristics of this reactive affirmation of cultures and identi-
ties in South and Southeast Asia in the hope that it will also con-
vey something of the common human experience with the
politics of cultural selfhood and with the more specific tragedy
of lost or stolen memories in other parts of the world.
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